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YOUNGSTOWN: PAGES FROM THE BOOK
OF DISQUIETUDE
Philip Bobbitt*
This essay is dedicated to Lloyd N. Cutler
INTRODUCTION
The Youngstown holding is widely admired. One reads with
pride those passages in which the Supreme Court denies to a
president with whom they are in considerable political sympathy
the power to enlarge executive authority by militarizing the
homeland. And yet one wonders, as we confront in the 21st cen-
tury a lethal foreign enemy who has demonstrated the ability to
infiltrate and assault the domestic environment, precisely what
restraints ought to govern a presidential response to that enemy.
PART ONE: A MODAL ANALYSIS OF THE
YOUNGSTOWN CASE
I. THE FORMS OF ARGUMENT
It is customary among certain theorists to say that there are
six forms of argument that supply the rationales for construc-
tions of the constitutional law of the United States. These forms
are called the historical (relying on the intentions of the framers
and ratifiers of the constitutional provision to be construed), tex-
tual (looking to the meaning of the words of the provision alone,
as these would be interpreted by the average man in the street
today), structural (inferring rules from the relationships that the
Constitution as a whole mandates among the various structures
it sets up), prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits
* A. W. Walker Centennial Chair in Law, The University of Texas at Austin.
Before returning to teaching in 2000, I served as the Senior Director for Critical Infra-
structure and, subsequently, the Senior Director for Strategic Planning at the National
Security Council which, as will become apparent, may be relevant to this essay.
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of a particular rule, especially regarding those risks borne by the
deciding Constitutional institution), doctrinal (applying rules
generated by the precedents that guide a particular constitu-
tional institution) and ethical (deriving rules from the commit-
ments to human rights proclaimed in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the powers to protect those rights reflected in the
Constitution).'
Sometimes these archetypal forms function as modalities of
constitutional law; that is, they make up the ways in which the
truth or falsity of a legal proposition is determined, though they
are neither true nor false in themselves. There is some debate as
to whether there is a hierarchy among these modalities; my own
view is that there is not. They are, I would say, incommensur-
able but not incomparable.2
When the rationale for a constitutional decision such as is
given in a judicial opinion is described in terms of the modalities
employed, it is sometimes said to be the product of modal analy-
sis.
II. MODAL ANALYSIS
Modal analysis calls into question the assumption that justi-
fication legitimates law. Many movements and many volumes
have been founded on this unquestioned assumption, such as, for
example, the notorious pseudo-question called the "Counterma-
joritarian Objection" which depends upon the alleged deficit in
the legitimacy of judicial review that is attributed to its noncon-
formity with majoritian practices. A good deal of constitutional
commentary is an effort to produce justifications for particular
holdings or non-judicial decisions on the grounds that such gov-
ernmental actions lack legitimacy in the absence of non-legal, ex-
tra-modal justifications. The increasing irrelevance of, for ex-
ample, the annual Forewords to the Harvard Law Review-or
indeed of law reviews and law journals generally-may in part
be laid at the door of the unthinking pursuit of this objective.
Casting off from this assumption permits us to abandon also
the idea that the rationale for a decision is-or should be-a re-
capitulation of the reasons why the decision was reached in the
first place. If judicial opinions, for example, are legitimated by
1. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford U.
Press, 1982).
2. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (Blackwell Publishers, 1991).
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certain conventional argumentative practices, then the rationale
is an effort to provide guidance for future legitimating occa-
sions-future rationales for future decisions-and not a kind of
talking cure for judicial neuroses.
Modal analysis does away with the allegedly fundamental
characterization of law as an epiphenomenon, a symptom of ex-
tra-legal relations, and replaces this characterization with a de-
scription of law as a discrete social activity, no more or less fun-
damental than other activities that it both shapes and takes
shape from. Thus modal analysis is an implicit attack on Legal
Realism no less than Marxism; such analysis treats the insights of
the former as the disturbing answers to irrelevant questions
("why did the judge decide as he did?"), and the dialectic of the
latter as a circular privileging of certain social phenomena-
including Marxism itself-over others leading, as circular hierar-
chies do, to an endless regress. For similar reasons, modal analy-
sis is no more sympathetic to Formalism or McCloskeyan de-
mocratic theory. Legitimation does not depend upon the
correspondence between behavior and theory; that is, it does not
depend upon justification.
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Revisiting Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer? provides
an excellent opportunity to undertake a modal analysis because
the various Supreme Court opinions in that case provide modal
exemplars of a remarkable purity of form. If the style of a par-
ticular judge, as well as the different notions of style in particular
eras, can be explained as a preference for one type of argument
over others, then Youngstown presents a stylistic display of un-
usual clarity and beauty, as we shall see. Three great judges with
sharply etched styles (Black/textual, Frankfurter/prudential,
Jackson/structural) are joined by three other judges whose opin-
ions are scarcely less severe in their adherence to particular con-
stitutional modalities (Douglas/prudential, Clark/doctrinal, Vin-
son et alia/historical and ethical.)
THE BLACK OPINION
The opinion for the majority is written by Justice Black.4 It
can be summarized as follows: the President is empowered by
3. 343 U.S. 579 (1951).
4. Id. at 582.
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the Constitutional text to execute laws; there is no executive
power in the text of the Constitution that authorizes the Execu-
tive to legislate laws; therefore only action by Congress or a con-
stitutional provision can supply the necessary precondition to
executive action; there is no statutory or explicit constitutional
basis for conscripting the assets of the steel industry; thus the
President's action is unlawful because it is unauthorized.5
The textual approach that pervades this opinion can be con-
veyed by a few excerpts:
The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem
either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.
There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to
take possession of property as he did here. Nor is there any
act of Congress to which our attention has been directed from
which such a power can fairly be implied ....
[Therefore iut is clear that if the President had authority to
issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of
the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitu-
tional language grants this power to the President .... [The
Government relies] on provisions in Article II which say that
"[t]he executive [p]ower shall be vested in a President"...;
that "he shall take [clare that the [flaws be faithfully exe-
cuted"; and that he "shall be Commander in Chief of -the
Army and Navy of the United States."
The order cannot be properly sustained as an exercise of
the President's military power as Commander in Chief [de-
spite cases upholding broad powers in a theatre of war.] Such
cases need not concern us here ....
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the sev-
eral constitutional provisions that grant executive power to
the President.... [T]he President's power to see that the laws
are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a law-
maker....
It is said that other Presidents without congressional au-
thority have taken possession of private business enterprises
in order to settle labor disputes. But even if this be true,
5. Id. at 582-89.
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Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutional au-
thority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the
powers vested by the Constitution "in the Government."
6
The unusual characteristics of this opinion-its disdain for
precedent, its utter lack of any expression of concern for the
practical consequences of permitting the Youngstown strike to
continue in wartime, its extravagant reading of the necessary and
proper clause so at odds with the structural rendering in
McCulloch, and, most characteristically, its syntactical reliance
on the implication that the phrase "faithfully execute the law"
requires legislation that must come from another's hand--all de-
rive from a textual approach to constitutional construction. Any
precedent that is inconsistent with the text is a mistake; that
there is a long line of mistakes is hardly a persuasive rationale
for perpetuating their holdings. Nor do appeals to prudence fare
any better under this approach. The text alone is in the hands of
the People; if they wish to run mortal risks by refusing to amend
that text, what right does a judge have to reverse their judg-
ment?
We should not be misled by rhetorical feints in the direction
of structural argument such as the phrase, "In the framework of
our Constitution," because this flourish only serves to introduce
the textual argument that "the President's power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker.",7 Similarly, though Justice Black writes that "we
cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that
the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate
power as such to take possession of private property,"8 the only
reason given for this assertion is that, "This is a job for the Na-
tion's lawmakers, not for its military authorities."
Opinions like this used to drive Justice Frankfurter wild
(and madden a good many other law professors who taught or
had taught at the Harvard Law School). The rejection of practi-
cality seemed to them either reckless or disingenuous, or both.
What is the craft in the argument just given? Why exactly is this
"a job for the Nation's lawmakers" and not for its military au-
thorities? And yet Black's opinion does capture rather well the
attitude one would expect from the great mass of our people at
that time: slightly uncertain as to the constitutional basis for war
6. Id. at 585-88.
7. Id. at587.
8. Youngstown Co Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1951).
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in Korea, apprehensive about any sudden or untoward changes
in the relation of the government to private property, and deeply
reverent of the Constitutional text and its ability to see us
through.
This union of contemporary public opinion and constitu-
tional decisionmaking is what textual argument strives to
achieve. Law professors may prefer the Jackson opinion today;
but would the public share this preference if, say, to fight terror-
ism we were faced with a presidential ban on software encryp-
tion despite the absence of Congressional action? Wouldn't the
public want to fall back on the certainties of the text precisely
when security concerns seem especially murky?
Human beings are not the simple product of their experi-
ences, the multiplication result of many "factors." But it is
noteworthy that there is no ardent practitioner of textual argu-
ment on the U.S. Supreme Court today; is it coincidental that
there are also no persons who have ever held high federal elec-
tive office, such as Black's Senate seat?
THE JACKSON OPINION
Justice Jackson announces early on in his concurrence that
he will be offering a structural argument. In the first paragraph
he writes, "The tendency is strong to emphasize transient results
upon policies-such as wages or stabilization-and lose sight of
enduring consequences upon the balanced structure of our Re-
public."" It is characteristic of this approach that its practitioners
often find it necessary to tell us what it is not, particularly as here
when prudential argument with which it is often confused is in
contention. Indeed much of the Jackson opinion is directed to-
ward fending off other approaches to the constitutional decision
at hand.
Thus these sentences:
Just what our forefathers did envision or would have envi-
sioned had they foreseen modern conditions must be divined
from materials as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called
upon to interpret for Pharoah.10 (contra historical argument)
9. Id. at 634.
10. Id.
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And court decisions are indecisive because of the judicial
practice, of dealing with the -largest questions in the most nar-
row way." (contra doctrinal argument)
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does
not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of
any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single
Articles torn from context.... I have heretofore, and do now,
give to the enumerated powers the scope and elasticity af-
forded by what seem to be reasonable, practical implications
instead of at the rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textual-
ism.... Subtle shifts take place in the centers of real power
that do not show on the face of the Constitution.1 2 (contra tex-
tual argument)
The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of in-
herent powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency asks us to
do what many think would be wise, although it is something
the forefathers omitted.... We may also suspect that they
suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emer-
gencies. 3 (contra prudential argument)
The Solicitor General lastly grounds support of the seizure
upon nebulous, inherent powers never expressly granted but
said to have accrued to the office from the customs and claims
of preceding administrations.' 4 (contra ethical argument)
These statements indicate what the basis for the opinion is
not; what it is, what it cannot usefully be understood by ignoring,
is structural argument, perhaps the most distinguished example
in the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court since
McCulloch v. Maryland.5
Structural arguments are deceptively simple. They typically
depend on three or four steps: an uncontroversial statement de-
rived from an explicit provision about the structure of govern-
ment (for example, "We have states"); an inference from this
structure when it is augmented with the premise that relation-
ships should be so construed as to give the structure the best
11. Id. at 635.
12. Id. at 635-53.
13. Id. at 649-50.
14. Id. at 646. The one clear expression of an ethical approach ("The essence of
our free Government is 'leave to live by no man's leave, underneath the law'-to be gov-
erned by those impersonal forces which we call law ") while beautifully rendered, does
not form part of the argument and is subordinated to the next sentence ("Our Govern-
ment is fashioned to fulfill this concept so far as humanly possible") which is structural.
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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chance of success ("There must be one thing that states can do
that is not determined by the federal government"); a practical
assertion about how this inference manifests itself ("Controlling
a state's budget is a power such that if it were in the hands of the
federal government states would as a practical matter cease to
exist qua states"); a conclusion that addresses the case at hand
("Whether the institutional relationships promulgated by the
Constitution require or are incompatible with or are irrelevant
to the question: Can the Congress pass a statute that signifi-
cantly impairs the budgetary discretion of states?" 6). Thus
structural approaches often blend text (step 1), history (step 2),
and prudence (step 3) to create a new archetype-the structural
modality. 17
Justice Jackson's argument may be summarized as follows:
1. The Constitution provides for an Executive power; 2. It was
intended that practice would integrate the dispersed powers of
government into a workable set of relationships; 3. Grouping
practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others
may challenge, the exercise of Executive power depends on this
factor of relativity among the branches. Thus, the President's
authority is at its maximum when Congress has authorized his
acts; his authority is less when he must rely on whatever inherent
power he possesses in concurrence with the Congress and Con-
gress has not spoken on the matter at hand; his authority is least
when he must claim that it is exclusive because Congress has
acted contrary to his own acts. On this basis, Jackson concludes
that, because the Congress has explicitly refused to provide the
power exercised here, the President must demonstrate that his
power is both inherent and preclusive. t9 That is part One of the
opinion.
The Second part examines the various bases on which such
a claim can be pressed. First, there are the provisions in Article
II that the "executive power be vested in a President" (the so-
16. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
17. Nor do single modalities retain their character when used in new decisional con-
texts. Thus, as we shall see, arguments that compose precedents for the Executive, for
example, can become the basis of ethical arguments when those precedents are analyzed
and applied by judges; prudential arguments by the framers in The Federalist became
structural arguments for decision-makers following ratification; and all the other five
forms become doctrine when they are adopted by an authoritative court as the rationales
for decisions.
18. Youngstown Co. Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,634-55 (1951).
19. Id. at 640.
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called "stewardship" theory of the presidency2°) and that the
president be Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy,
and that the president take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted. These of course are the same three bases for the presi-
dent's authority addressed by Justice Black, but notice how dif-
ferent the attack on them is when it comes from Jackson.
Having set up the question in structural terms-the "relativity"
as Jackson puts it of presidential authority, i.e., its relational na-
ture vis-d-vis the Congress-he gives structural answers.
The mere location of executive power in the presidency
cannot also create power; if it did there would be no point in ex-
plicitly providing, as the Constitution does21, that the President
can require the written opinions of his cabinet, a matter that
"would seem to be inherent in the Executive if anything is." '22
Similarly, if the president, whose control over foreign affairs is
largely plenary, could bootstrap his primacy in that sphere into
an enlarged domestic role, then the relation between the execu-
tive and the other branches would be altered. "No penance
would ever expiate the sin against free government of holding
that a President can escape control of executive powers by law
through assuming his military role.
23
Finally, Jackson invokes the fundamental structure of the
government, limited sovereignty-and the relation between hu-
man rights and government power-to refute the notion that the
"laws" to be faithfully tended convey, but do not restrict, presi-
dential authority. The third basis on which the Solicitor General
had relied is that the president "shall take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.",
2p
That authority must be matched against the words of the
Fifth Amendment that 'No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.' One gives a
governmental authority that reaches so far as there is law, the
other gives a private right that authority shall go no farther.
These signify about all there is of the principle that ours is a
20. Which holds that "the executive is subject only to the people, and, under the
Constitution, bound to serve the people affirmatively in cases where the Constitution
does not explicitly forbid him to render the service." Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiog-
raphy 378 (MacMillan Co., 1916).
21. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3.
22. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579 (footnote 9).
23. Id. at646.
24. Id.
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government of laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves
to rulers only if under rules.
25
Most interestingly, Jackson takes up the numerous cases in
which many presidents have acted in the absence of Congres-
sional authority and here too provides a structural response.
That response is his comparative description of the structures of
other constitutional systems. Notice carefully that Jackson em-
phasizes that this is not a prudential argument:
This contemporary foreign experience may be inconclusive
as to the wisdom of lodging emergency powers somewhere in
a modern government. But it suggests that emergency powers
are consistent with free government only when their control is
lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them.
26
Finally, Jackson's concluding lines in the opinion stress the
structural role of the court in judicial review:
With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have dis-
covered no technique for long preserving free government ex-
cept thatthe Executive be under the law, and that the law be
made by parliamentary deliberations. Such institutions may
be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be
last, not first, to give them up.27
THE FRANKFURTER OPINION
Frankfurter's prudential opinion too begins with an attack
on the textualism of the majority opinion: "It is an inadmissibly
narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it
to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which
life has written upon them." But unlike Jackson, Frankfurter
prefers to acknowledge rather than distinguish the other compet-
ing forms of constitutional argument and then, rather subtly,
transmute each into a prudential argument.
For example, historical argument:
The Founders of this Nation were not imbued with the
modern cynicism that the only thing that history teaches is
that it teaches nothing. They acted on the conviction that the
experience of man sheds a good deal of light on his nature. It
sheds a good deal of light not merely on the need for effective
25. Id.
26. Id. at 652 (emphasis supplied).
27. Id. at 655.
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power, if a society is to be at once cohesive and civilized, but
also on the need for limitations on the power of governors
over the governed... [Thus] our democracy implies the reign
of reason on the most extensive scale;
28
Or structural argument:
To, that end they rested the structure of our central gov-
ernment on the system of checks and balances. For them the
doctrine of separation of powers was not mere theory; it was a
felt necessity. Not so long ago it was fashionable to find our
system of checks and balances obstructive to effective gov-
ernment. It was easy to ridicule that system as outmoded-
too easy;
or even ethos:
No doubt a government with distributed authority, subject
to be challenged in the courts: of law, at least long enough to
consider and adjudicate the challenge, labors under restric-
tions from which other governments are free. It has not been
our tradition to envy such governments.... The price was
deemed not too high in view of the safeguards which these re-
strictions afford.
In each of these passages the standard form ("the Founders
thought that. .") gives way to a prudential turn ("the Founders
knew from experience, which taught them that.. ."); or "our
structure of separated powers" becomes "a matter of felt neces-
sity" and our protection of human rights when measured against
the costs to efficiency is not a bad bargain, and so on.
The core of Frankfurter's affirmative argument, too, is pru-
dential. Brandeis is quoted to great effect; Marshall's admoni-
tion that we should never forget that "it is a constitution we are
expounding," without which no ambitious prudential opinion is
complete, is introduced (twice); the prudential role of the court
in deciding this matter is given attention to the same degree that
it is ignored in the majority's opinion.3'
Frankfurter begins with this assertion: "It cannot be con-
tended that the President would have had power to issue this or-
der had Congress explicitly negated such authority in formal leg-
28. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 613.
31. Id. at 589-614.
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islation. '3 2 But why is that? After all, Jackson bases his analysis
on precisely such an assertion by the Executive. The reason is to
be found-and perhaps can only be appreciated from a modal
point of view-in this passage in which Frankfurter introduces,
very indirectly, "the Government's argument that overriding
public interest prevents the issuance of the injunction despite the
illegality of the seizure"33:
"Balancing the equities" when considering whether an
injunction should issue, is lawyers' jargon for choosing
between conflicting public interests. When Congress itself has
struck the balance, has defined the weight to be given the
competing interests, a court of equity is not justified in
ignoring that pronouncement under the guise of exercising
equitable discretion.34
It is crucial to remember that prudential argument entered
the arsenal of available modalities of legitimation only in the
20th century with the Ashwander rules by Brandeis (tellingly re-
ferred to by Frankfurter early in his concurrence in Youngs-
town.) Having defined the perspective from which prudential-
ism is to operate-judicial self-protection-the rest of the pieces
fall into place. A clumsy prudentialism like that of the Burton
concurrence ("We find no such power available to [the presi-
dent] under the present circumstances. The present situation is
not comparable to that of an imminent invasion or threatened
attack") gives way, in Frankfurter's hands, to a far more careful,
nuanced prudential treatment of great finesse ("In this case, reli-
ance on the powers that flow from declared war has been com-
mendably disclaimed by the Solicitor General"3 5). The fact that
Burton is unlikely to know, much less appreciate, the complexi-
ties of military risk in Korea does not also embarrass Frankfurter
because he is in the position of deferring to those authorities
who do appreciate those risks.
THE CLARK OPINION
Whereas Frankfurter begins his opinion with the familiar
words of Marshall in McCulloch, Justice Clark begins with the
obscure Marshall opinion in Little v. Bareme. There the Court
decided a case arising from the United States' first war, the war
32. Id. at 602.
33. Id. at 609.
34. Youngstown Co Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609-10 (1951).
35. Id. at 613.
[Vol. 19:3
2002] PAGES FROM THE BOOK OFDISQUIETUDE 15
with France, a conflict as little known to Americans today as is
the case itself. That war, like the war in Korea, was fought with-
out benefit of a declaration of war, a fact that should give some
pause to those who think they have an unshakeable picture of
the framers' and ratifiers' requirements on this matter. The war
with France was prosecuted by Adams pursuant to six statutes;
one of these created the American navy; one provided authority
to seize vessels on the high seas bound for a French port. The
difficulty arose when the president issued instructions that em-
braced other vessels, one of which, the "Flying Fish" was bound
from (not to) a French harbor. Acknowledging that the presi-
dent might very well have the authority to empower officers of
the United States to seize such vessels in the absence of statutory
authority, relying alone on his inherent powers, the Court never-
theless unanimously held that the instructions were unlawful in
the face of adverse Congressional authorization. Justice Clark
clearly marks his opinion as relying on the doctrinal modality
when he writes, having summarized Little,
I know of no subsequent holding of this Court to the con-
trary.... In my view-taught me not only by the decision of
Chief Justice Marshall in Little v. Bareme but also by a score
of other pronouncements of distinguished members of this
bench-the Constitution does grant to the President extensive
authority in times of grave and imperative national emer-
gency .... I cannot sustain the seizure in question because
here, as in Little v. Bareme Congress had prescribed methods
to be followed by the President in meeting the emergency at
hand.36
Not surprisingly Clark closes his opinion with a quotation
from Justice Story, one of our greatest doctrinal jurists, about
the responsibility of the judge to render decisions "however
[they] may differ from that of very great authorities."" No pas-
sive virtues here.
THE DISSENT
Chief Justice Vinson, joined by Justices Reed and Minton,
saw the legislative issue rather differently. For the dissenters-
which included a former six-term member of the House-it sim-
ply wasn't a question of the president acting in defiance of Con-
gressional action. Instead, it seemed to them that Congress had
36. Id. at 660-62.
37. Id. at 667.
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failed to act-repeatedly-and was unable to act decisively ow-
ing to the political context of divided government38 in which it
found itself. Had the Congress actually passed a statute forbid-
ding the president from seizing assets, the dissenters would have
reached a different judgment. If Congress in fact opposed the
seizure, it was free through statute or joint resolution to say so
(and take the political heat). Simply refusing to write into law
the action taken by the president was not sufficient to allow the
inference that this action was in defiance of their wishes.39
This view of the matter opened up the case to an historical
approach for, contrary to the received wisdom today, the fram-
ers did anticipate party divisions and had a good deal to say
about how to make government work in such conditions. Here it
is necessary to emphasize once more the importance of The Fed-
eralist Papers to the enterprise of historical argument.
It was the role of the Papers in ratification, principally in the
crucial state of New York but also that of Federalist ideas else-
where,4 ° that gave them the canonical status they now enjoy as
the principal interpretive resource for historical argument. That
is because these ideas were the "advertising" the ratifiers were
given as to the purposes of the Constitution and thus are the best
guide we have to the ratifiers' intentions in adopting that consti-
tution. And it is the ratifiers intentions, not the framers', that
have legal consequence because the ratifiers were the legal in-
struments of the People's sovereignty. To employ a homely le-
gal metaphor: the constitution is like a trust agreement, endowed
by a testator. Its drafters, the framers, were only the lawyers
who drew up the agreement. It is the ratifiers alone who were
empowered to give it legal significance because they, the testa-
38. The Democrats had held the White House since 1932; the Republicans had re-
cently swept both houses of Congress.
39. Following the issuance of the Executive Order, "twelve days passed without
action by Congress. On April 21, 1952, the President sent a letter to the President of the
Senate in which he again.described the purpose and need for his action and again stated
his position that 'The Congress can, if it wishes, reject the course of action I have fol-
lowed in this matter.' Congress has not so acted at this date." Youngstown Co Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 677 (1951) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
40. It is often objected that the Federalist essays were not reprinted in all the states,
nor were consulted by all the members of the ratifying conventions, and thus have no
authoritative interpretive status in historical argument. This objection misses the point
entirely; it is not that the Papers were an original contribution by great figures that enti-
tles them to be given constitutional weight. See, e.g., David McGowan, Ethos in Law
and History: Alexander Hamilton, the Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 Minn. L.
Rev. 755 (2001). It is rather that they express ideas in circulation at the time-elegantly
in the Papers, less so perhaps elsewhere-and were not original that makes them so valu-
able.
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tors as it were, endowed the document with authority. The Fed-
eralist tells us what the lawyers told their clients the latter were
agreeing to when they gave their consent to the document. For
this reason The Federalist has been, as Marshall wrote in
McCulloch, "justly supposed to be entitled to great respect [by
,41those] expounding the constitution.
Quoting from Federalist 48 and 70, Vinson wrote,
Only by instilling initiative and vigor in all of the three de-
partments of Government, declared Madison, could tyranny
in any form be avoided. Hamilton added, 'Energy in the Ex-
ecutive is a leading character in the definition of good gov-
ernment. It is essential to the protection of the community
against foreign attack; it is not less essential to the steady ad-
ministration of the laws.'
4 2
Rejecting a prudential approach43 , Vinson wrote that
[W]e are not called upon today to expand the Constitution
to meet a new situation. For, in this case, we need only look
to history and time-honored principles of constitutional
law.... Executive inaction in such a situation, courting na-
tional disaster, is foreign to the concept of energy and initia-
tive in the Executive as created by the Founding Fathers...
The Framers knew, as we should know in these times of peril,
that there is real danger in Executive weakness. There is no
cause to fear Executive tyranny so long as.. .the Executive
acts, as he did in this case, only to save the situation until
Congress could act.44
Vinson's use of the Federalist, and his reliance on acts by
Washington, John Adams and John Marshall (while he was a
Congressmen) are typical of historical constitutional argument.
It is assumed that the framers' acts possess a constitutional sali-
ence not because they issued from the framers but because these
acts occurred before an audience of, and were themselves
wrought by, ratifiers. But the same cannot be said for evidence
of presidential action by Cleveland, or Lincoln or Taft. What
role as constitutional argument do these references play?
It is tempting to conclude that these are prudential argu-
ments, partly because they address past crises (and thus provide
41. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4Wheat.) at 433.
42. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 682
43. As examples of such an approach the dissent quite appropriately cites United
States v. Classic and Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell.
44. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 683, 703-04.
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a practical guide to dealing with emergencies), and partly be-
cause the pattern they describe fits Bickel's celebrated descrip-
tion of the prudential position: "The accomplished fact, affairs
and interests that have formed around it, and perhaps popular
acceptance of it-these are elements.., that may properly enter
into the.., shaping of the judgment. 4 5 But the type of constitu-
tional argument is determined not by' definition but by use, and
here Vinson is using these incidents to establish a tradition of
presidential leadership in times of crisis. This strikes me as es-
sentially an ethical claim 46-that is, one rooted in the Declara-
tion of Independence's ethos of limited government which pre-
sumes that all residual authority belongs in the private sphere. I
take Vinson to be arguing that the private arrangements of pro-
duction and wage bargaining are qualified by the obligation of
government to secure the rights of its citizens. This element of
the constitutional ethos is established, as is customary, by look-
ing at the habits of our people as much as of our government,
and it is the habitual to which Vinson turns. His argument may
be summarized as: The framers and ratifiers intended that the
Executive be permitted to act in certain emergencies subject to
ratification of these acts by Congress; subsequent history dis-
closes many examples of this kind of presidential action, which
has been widely accepted by our People and our institutions.
IV. THE DISCREET CHARM OF MODAL ANALYSIS
I have written elsewhere about the advantages I believe ac-
company modal analysis and my preference for this sort of de-
scription over others. Not the least of my reasons is that modal
analyses do not claim to explain anything; they do not tell us why
a decision came out the way it did, they do not predict future
voting patterns, they make no pretension to necessity, even to
cause-and-effect. Does that mean they are not very helpful in
dealing with future problems? In Part Two of this paper I will
construct scenarios about the future in which a president con-
45. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 116 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).
46. Though there are prudential elements in the opinion ("On [the majority's] view,
the President is left powerless at the very moment when the need for action may be most
pressing and when no one, other than he, is immediately capable of action") that sup-
plement its primary historical approach, the distinction may be assessed this way: does
the dissent cite the historical record as proof of the wisdom of presidential intervention
or as evidence that it has, for better or worse, occurred and been accepted as legitimate?
Constitutional decisions that were made by the president on a prudential basis-like Lin-
coln's suspension of habeas corpus-can be used subsequently as doctrine by future
presidents or ethos by judges.
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fronts a problem not very dissimilar to that which led to Youngs-
town. I will suggest how different modal approaches might re-
solve that problem. One hopes that this exercise could help a fu-
ture president and thus guide his constitutional decisionmaking
in advance of a future court's decision. This is one of the impor-
tant contributions of modal analysis: it enables decisionmakers
to analyze constitutional problems in the absence of a court's de-
cision. Thus, unlike so much constitutional theory, it is available
to persons whose convictions differ from that of the theorist's,
and to institutions that have interests different from those of
courts.
PART TWO: SCENARIO PLANNING FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
I. SCENARIO PLANNING AS ANTICIPATORY
PRECEDENT
Hypotheticals are a staple of law teaching. The slight
change in facts that, thaumatrope-like, shifts the perception is a
crucial art form for anyone who desires to escape the impress of
dogma and see a problem (and an answer) in the round. Before
the transition in the constitutional order from nation-state to
market state,47 of which September 11th, 2001 was both a menac-
ing harbinger and a lethal reminder, coping with the constitu-
tional future of the State was simply a question of looking ahead,
extrapolating from the present. Realizing one's policy objectives
was thus a matter of strategic planning. The ACLU and the
Federalist Society, the Children's Defense Fund and the Chris-
tian Coalition all participated in rather predictable ways; so it
was also in the classroom-just consult a few former final exams
on file to corroborate this. The timeliest hypotheticals in consti-
tutional criminal procedure had to do with Miranda rights, not
military tribunals; in foreign relations law there persisted a devo-
lutionary movement to give localities more say in international
affairs, not to require of them ethnic profiling and detention on a
vast scale in service of an international yet undeclared war; law
professors questioned whether the ABM Treaty could be re-
nounced, not whether the UN and NATO could be silently su-
perceded by ad hoc "coalitions of the willing." Faith-based so-
47. Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History
(Alfred A. Knopf, 2002).
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cial initiatives were debated for their First Amendment prob-
lems; no one suggested rounding up lists of persons who at-
tended a particular mosque.
Then quite abruptly, no one really had a vision of the future
because the future was going to be so unlike the past. We sud-
denly needed to approach the future with an acceptance that
simple forecasting was not going to be useful to us for a while,
that no one had any clear view of what was coming and therefore
no one could offer a realistic vision for the future. Instead we
had to sharpen our skills at imagining different futures so that
we had some idea of what was at stake when the choices the fu-
ture would present us with were actually upon us. To say this is
to contrast "strategic planning" with "scenario planning." Both
rely on intelligence estimates that are based on the careful analy-
sis of immense amounts of information, sorting out the true from
the false, assigning probabilities to information that might be ei-
ther true or false, guessing what the future will be like if all the
relevant facts were available to the analyst.4  No one has
grasped this better than Joseph Nye, the Dean of the Kennedy
School at Harvard, who wrote:
Greater complexity in the structure of power means greater
uncertainty in estimating the future. Polities often undergo
dramatic, nonlinear change, but such changes have become
much more frequent than during the Cold War. In the 1980s,
for example, if one were estimating the number of nuclear
weapons South Africa would have in the 1990s, one would
have calculated what their uranium enrichment plant could
produce and answered 'six or seven.' But the correct answer
today turns out to be zero because of radical political discon-
tinuities associated with the transition to majority rule and the
end of the Cold War. Similarly, if one were to estimate today
how many nuclear weapons a country with no nuclear facili-
ties might have in five years, the linear answer would be zero.
But that would change if the country were able to purchase
stolen nuclear weapons on the transnational black market.
49
This is precisely the problem. And Nye's recommenda-
tion-the construction of alternative scenarios rather than sin-
gle-point predictions in order not so much to predict the future
as to help policymakers think about the future-is precisely the
solution. But scenario planning is not widely practiced in gov-
48. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Peering into the Future, 73 Foreign Affairs 82 (July/August
1994).
49. Id. at 87.
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ernments or classrooms - as opposed to corporations-and it is
easily confused with strategic planning.
Scenario planning relies on the creation of hypothetical, al-
ternative stories about the future that share certain factual as-
sumptions but differ based on decisions made within each sce-
nario; strategic planning is a formalized procedure that aims to
produce an integrated system of decisions based on predeter-
mined goals. That is, strategic planning assumes an answer to
the question that scenario planning poses: what sort of future do
we want? The time horizon for scenario planning is typically
from 5 to more than 25 years; strategic plans usually go no fur-
ther out than 1 to 3 years. Inputs to scenario planning are more
qualitative, i.e., they share certain factual estimates about the fu-
ture but emphasize economic, technological, resource and cul-
tural trends. Inputs to strategic planning tend to be more quanti-
tative, looking to past performance, forecasts and probabilities.
Thus scenario planning exploits uncertainties, in order to allow
the creation of alternative futures; strategic planning attempts to
minimize uncertainty. The results of scenario planning are mul-
tiple, alternative outcomes versus the quantified single outcome
based on the likeliest scenario that is the result of strategic plan-
ning.50
The difficulty with'implementing Nye's proposed solution is
that such scenario construction depends upon a dialogue with
decisionmakers at many levels in order to create a culture that is
sensitive to the implications of change and alert to opportunities
to create favorable conditions for change. Members of this cul-
ture produce the raw material on which scenarios are based; in-
tensive briefings with them, once the scenarios are written, are as
important to the process as the written product. But the judges,
presidents and their senior subordinates, and other key constitu-
tional actors seldom spend the time together necessary to bring
such a culture into being. High-impact but low-probability con-
tingencies, which are crucial to the imaginative dialogue of the
scenario process, are of little interest to busy politicians, law pro-
fessors and judges. Competing scenarios, in the absence of a cul-
50. See Scenario Planning: Forging a Link with Strategic Decision Making 51 (Cor-
porate Executive Board, 1999); Arie de Geus, The Living Company (Harvard Business
School Press, 1997); David H. Mason, Scenario-Based Planning Decision Model for the
Learning Organization, 22 Planning Review (March/April 1994); lan Wilson, The Effec-
tive Implementation of Scenario Planning: Changing the Corporate Culture, in Liam
Fahey and Robert H. Randall, eds., Learning from the Future: Competitive Foresight Sce-
narios 352 (John Wiley & Sons, 1998).
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ture of dialogue animated by a sense of rapport are liable to de-
generate into political sermons in the classroom or in the media
in which the "future" turns out to support the policy preferences
of the author.
Things are easier for the business corporation. In the early
1970s Royal Dutch Shell had been regarded as the weakest of
the great multinational oil companies, known as the "Seven Sis-
ters." At that time Shell began a series of "scenario" studies that
are credited with assisting that corporation's remarkable rise
since then. As early as 1972, one of Shell scenarios envisaged
the formation of OPEC and the sudden rise in oil prices that hit
the world in the winter of 1973-74; and a subsequent scenario
correctly described the equally dramatic drop in oil prices that
began in early 1986. In 1984, a Shell scenario (called "The
Greening of Russia") described the possible break-up of the So-
viet Union and the ensuing chaotic conditions in Eastern
Europe. But to depict these descriptions, which turned out to be
accurate, as validating the scenario process themselves is to mis-
understand its significance completely. After all, if a corporation
is doing more than one "estimate" it will often be able to predict
a rise (or fall) that turns out to be true. Rather the scenario
process made some futures appear less plausible that had more
or less been taken for granted, and it prepared managers to look
for signs of otherwise unexpected futures. In the absence of this
preparation, managers would be inclined to shoe-horn events
into their settled expectations or ignore altogether outlying facts.
Since Shell's highly publicized success with scenario plan-
ning in the 1970s and 1980s, many corporations have attempted
to employ this tool with the hope of achieving similar dramatic
results. The Corporate Executive Board reports, however, that
there has been some disillusion with the scenario planning proc-
ess as a result. "Perhaps the single greatest driver of this dissat-
isfaction," the Board has concluded, "is a widely held yet mis-
guided expectation that scenario planning readily and directly
improves strategic decision making; misconceptions rooted in
scenario planning's history promote this expectation.. ."" The
problem is that Shell's successes are inevitably translated into
the results of correctly predicting the future, rather than ena-
bling its decisionmakers to cope better with that future as it, un-
51. Corporate Executive Board, ibid. For an excellent treatment of the scenario
process see Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Paths to Strategic Insight for Your-
self and Your Company (Doubleday, 1991).
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predictably, unfolded. Prepared by their alternative scenarios,
Shell executives were able to see a pattern in events-a story-
that their competitors were forced to analyze as mere noise, a
chaotic departure from conventional expectations.
The most important aspect of this process is summed up by
Shell as: "[b]y considering alternative futures, we begin to see
that the future is shaped not only by the past but by what we
think is possible and by the choices we make." 52
Using the following hypothetical, I will generate six scenar-
ios-six opinions derived from the dominant modal approaches
in Youngstown and six possible worlds that occur in their after-
maths.
II. THE SETTING
[This establishes the factual parameters with which the various
scenarios must cope."3 ]
On April 1, 2004 the President returns to Austin, Texas to
address the Texas Legislature. His itinerary includes an awards
ceremony of local volunteer leaders, an appearance at a magnet
school, and a visit to a basketball game.
The FBI has information suggesting a possible threat to the
President's party from a terrorist group, but has no specific intel-
ligence on the form of the attack. The group is suspected of hav-
ing acquired biological pathogens, including anthrax, and of hav-
ing procured aerosolization equipment. The FBI issues a general
threat warning to local law enforcement but does not deem the in-
formation serious enough to alert state or municipal health au-
thorities.
April 8: FBI informants report rumors that something hap-
pened while the president was in Texas. The Secret Service issues
a denial.
52. Public Global Scenarios 1992-2020, 2 .... [T]he purpose of scenario planning is
not to pinpoint future events but to highlight large-scale forces that push the future in
different directions. It's about making these forces visible, so that if they do happen, the
planner will at least recognize them. It's about helping make better decisions today.
Scenario planning begins by identifying the focal issue or decision. There are an infinite
number of stories that we could tell about the future; our purpose is to tell those that
matter, that lead to better decisions."
53. This hypothetical is directly derived from Dr. Tara O'Toole, Smallpox: An At-
tack Scenario, 5 Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, No. 4 Special Issue 540 (July-
August 1999) though some changes have been made.
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. April 12: A 20 year old student goes to the UT infirmary with
respiratory distress and muscle aches. She is pale, has a tempera-
ture of 102F and is slightly leukopenic but the physical exam and
lab results are otherwise normal. She is diagnosed as having flu
and is sent home with instructions to drink fluids and take ibupro-
fen. Later that day a 40 year-old electrician employed by the state
arrives at the emergency room of Breckinridge city hospital, mani-
festing nausea, chest pains and difficulty breathing. He appears
pale, and has a temperature of 102F. As his breathing becomes
more labored he is put on a ventilator and removed to the inten-
sive care unit; because he has recently returned from a holiday in
Belize he is diagnosed as suffering dengue fever and put on the
critical list. Over the course of the day, four young adults come to
the university infirmary with influenza-like symptoms.
Coincidentally Senate hearings had recently been held on a
bill drafted by the Center for Disease Control that would give fed-
eral officials the power to act decisively in the event of a biological
attack or the outbreak of an infectious disease. Testimony at those
hearings asserted that, owing to the development of successful
public health measures, inoculations, vaccines, and modern anti-
biotics the ancient practice of quarantine had largely vanished
from 20th century America. Thus despite the emergence in the
U.S. of a constitutionally omnicompetent federal government for
over fifty years-from Darby to Lopez-this period of the high-
water mark of federal power did not witness any attempt to pass
legislation that would give the federal government quarantine au-
thority. The proposed Emergency Health Powers Act would
permit federal officials to compel a person to submit to a physical
exam or a test without a court order. Physicians and other health
workers could be forced to do this testing. While court orders
would be required for quarantines, officials could quarantine first
and go to court afterwards. Federal officials could compel persons
to be vaccinated or treated for infectious and non-infectious dis-
eases. The U.S. government would have broad emergency powers
to confiscate property and facilities, including subways, hospitals
and drug companies.
As the Easter recess approaches, it appears clear that con-
cerns about civil liberties and federalism have catalyzed opposi-
tion to the bill from both the left and the right and that it has little
chance of passage. The majority leader shelves the legislation.
April 14: The female student returns to the infirmary after
collapsing in class. Though her blood pressure is normal and her
temperature has stabilized at 102F, her breathing is strained. That
[Vol. 19:3
2002] PAGES FROM THE BOOK OFDISQUIETUDE 25
same day another state employee comes to the municipal emer-
gency room with similar symptoms. Texas state law, however,
forbids the sharing of information about an individual's health
status without his express consent; as a result, neither physicians in
the two hospitals nor public health authorities are made aware of
these two simultaneous cases.
In Washington, a member of the President's Secret Service
detail is admitted to George Washington hospital where he is di-
agnosed as suffering from anthrax. He is treated with Ciproxin, a
broad-spectrum antibiotic.
April 16: As a result of the Washington diagnosis, CDC alerts
hospitals in all cities where the Secret Service agent had traveled in
the preceding period .during which infection would have mani-
fested; Austin is among these cities. Five new cases present at the
university infirmary; two at other hospitals in the city. When both
the college infirmary and the city hospitals report similar cases,
FBI personnel are dispatched in order to secure biological sam-
ples from the patients. Military aircraft flies these samples to
CDC's Biosafety Level 4 lab in Atlanta. The FBI requests that
Austin city police be called to help maintain order at the infirmary
where rumors are circulating of a biological attack on campus.
City police at first direct that no patients, staff or visitors will be
allowed to leave the hospital until all occupants have been identi-
fied and their addresses recorded. More FBI agents and city po-
lice arrive on the infirmary grounds.
Hospital visitors are confused and angered by police refusal
to allow anyone to leave the hospital. Ambulances are re-routed
to other hospitals. The rumor that smallpox has broken out rap-
idly spreads through the campus, as do rumors that a terrorist
wanted by the FBI is in the infirmary. When the FBI attempts to
secure the records of the stricken student, city police and hospital
officials attempt to prevent this and a fight erupts. Three persons
are injured and sent to the infirmary emergency room which has
now been cordoned off by the FBI.
The local television stations report the scene on campus; the
local CNN affiliate arrives and demands access to the hospital and
the affected patients. Rumors about contagious diseases quickly
spread, including charges that meningitis, Ebola virus, smallpox
or measles have hit the campus. The FBI is reluctant to let anyone
leave the building, partly on the theory that some of the infected
persons might be perpetrators who accidentally have infected
themselves in the course of aerosolizing the anthrax spores. After
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an acrimonious conversation between the Texas Attorney General
and the United States Attorney General, FBI agents are with-
drawn and a cordon around the university infirmary is main-
tained by local police.
April 19-29: Over the next ten days anthrax cases are re-
ported in a number of cities; there appears to be some link be-
tween audio equipment used by the White House and infections
that present in each of the venues the president has visited since
the beginning of the month. It is widely believed that the president
and his family have been inoculated, but not the members of his
Secret Service detail. A run on Ciproxin reduces commercially
available levels of the inventory of this drug to negligible levels.
When cases of anthrax infection begin to appear on Capitol Hill
(the president had addressed a joint session of Congress only two
weeks before), the Congress is put in recess.
April 30: That evening the President goes on television to in-
form the nation of the bioterrorist attack by unknown parties,
perhaps linked to remnants of the al Qaeda network. He vows
that the assailants will be identified and brought to justice; he
urges cooperation with health authorities; and he announces the
promulgation of an Executive Order that largely puts into effect
the CDC-drafted Emergency Health Powers Act that apparently
had been rejected by the Congress earlier that month. This Execu-
tive Order also purports to empower USAMRID54 (the United
States Army facility at Fort Dietrick) to manufacture Ciproxin
and to distribute it as directed by the CDC. Because the Stafford
Act requires that an emergency must cross state lines (and anthrax
is not contagious) or lead to a request from a state governor be-
fore the president can act, it is generally agreed by all sides that,
absent the Executive Order, federal officials are sharply restricted
in their ability to respond to the attack.
May 1: Lawyers for Bayer, Inc. (the owners of the Ciproxin
patent), the State of Texas, a number of insurance companies,
HMOs and the ACLU seek injunctions in various jurisdictions.
Three of these cases are consolidated and given an expedited hear-
ing before the U.S. Supreme Court on May 15.
54. U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases
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III. SIX OPINIONS AND THEIR AFTERMATHS
[The following excerpts of possible majority opinions of the U. S.
Supreme Court are paired with public and political reaction to
each opinion.]
THE TEXTUAL APPROACH
Nothing in the text of the Constitution explicitly authorizes
the Executive to maintain the public health. Nor does the provi-
sion in Article II that locates the power of Commander in Chief
in the President convey such authority, even in the face' of an at-
tack by a foreign entity (assuming this to be the case, which has
in fact not been determined) because medical treatment and
prevention per se are not acts appurtenant to the prosecution of
a belligerency. The enemy will not be defeated or deterred by
the treatment of those persons who are already infected. If the
President has the power to enforce the provisions of the Execu-
tive Order it must be owing to the Constitutional obligation that
he take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Because the
Congress refused to pass the Emergency Health Powers Act,
there is no such law for him to enforce. Therefore his action is
unlawful because it is unauthorized.
The timely rendering of a Supreme Court opinion relying on
this rationale caused the President to call Congress into an emer-
gency, virtual session linking all members via videoconferencing,
e-mail bulletin boards, and encrypted voting. The resulting legis-
lation was somewhat narrower in some respects than the over-
turned Executive Order (for example, it set up special virtual tri-
bunals that had to be satisfied before quarantines could be
ordered) and somewhat broader in other aspects (for example, it
provided for compensation to drug companies and HMOs).
As a result there was far less disturbance in the public and
more acceptance of the government's actions. The unity of Con-
gressional action with the immense prestige of a Court that defied
an apparent emergency in order to preserve the Constitution was
commented on by many; doubtless this legitimation accounted for
the public consensus that supported federal action. By summer
most Americans had been vaccinated for anthrax. No new cases
had been reported. The terrorists were not yet identified.
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THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH
The Constitution provides for an Executive power, even if
in rather general terms. These terms permit-and actually re-
quire, as a practical matter-that a concert of the dispersed au-
thorities among the various branches be achieved in order for
lawful action to take place. This results in a certain relativity
(rather than absolute power): presidential authority is greatest
when it is in harmony with the Congress, less so otherwise. In
the present case, there being no statute in place, we must decide
whether the President has acted in defiance of a considered
Congressional decision not to grant him statutory authority, or
whether the situation is sufficiently changed so that, whatever we
may conclude from Congress's failure to act, we may not say that
that decision governs present circumstances. To do otherwise
would allow the acts of terrorists to preclude any effective Con-
gressional action in response to the terror they have wrought.
No penance would ever expiate the sin against free govern-
ment of an unelected court's holding that wanton terror could
effectively emasculate the power to protect our people. The
Constitution is not, after all, a suicide pact. Until the Congress
shall have the opportunity to consider legislation in light of cur-
rent circumstances we cannot find that the President's actions
are in conflict with Congress's will. Rather they exist in that twi-
light of concurrent powers. Here, as in the case of Lincoln's sus-
pension of habeas corpus at the time of the Civil War, and Jef-
ferson's purchase of Louisiana, we must assume that Congress
will ratify these acts promptly when it has an opportunity; should
it choose to do otherwise, a different case would be presented to
us, which we would decide at that time.
This opinion buttressed the president's authority though, be-
cause it came so close to the 2004 elections, it did nothing to en-
hance the prestige of the Court itself The fact that the Court did
not even address the federalism issues arising from its own recent
precedents"5 which might have suggested that even Congress's au-
thority, had it chosen to exercise it, would have been exceeded by
the provisions of the Executive Order tended to detract from the
respect accorded the opinion and its authors (at least among law
professors and other judges.)
55. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Nevertheless, on the crucial issue of public safety and order,
the opinion checked an unraveling situation in the states where
some officials contended that anthrax inoculations were, statisti-
cally, more threatening to public health than the receding risk
flowing from the terrorist attacks. These officials were now rou-
tinely enjoined from interfering with federal action and much fric-
tion was thereby avoided.
THE PRUDENTIAL APPROACH
The Court finds itself called upon to balance two constitu-
tional values: the explicit allocation to Congress of the lawmak-
ing authority (assuming arguendo that this authority would sup-
port a statute empowering the president to promulgate the
challenged Executive Order), and the implicit authority that the
Executive protect the Commonwealth from mortal threats. If
we were called upon to construe a statute that the president be-
lieved to provide authority on which he might rely to support the
Executive Order-as the Solicitor General has intimated we
might do with respect to a number of Congressional laws (in-
cluding the Stafford Act, the legislation creating the CDC and
that establishing the Department of Health and Human Services,
inter alia)-we might well demur for we should not presume to
undertake the Congress's role in fitting these laws more closely
to our current, perilous situation. But we should never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding. Statutes are fre-
quently revised in light of necessity but the Constitution is meant
to endure crises; it is capable of being shaped by necessity with-
out losing its essential character. Here the principle must be: the
greater the threat to the survival of the society to whose protec-
tion the Constitution commits the Executive the greater the lee-
way that the Executive enjoys. Thus the burden shifts, and
courts must not presume to usurp the President's role by deter-
mining the particular policies that necessity requires.
When the very existence of our way of life is imperiled by a
lethal yet unknown enemy employing unseen agents both human
and viral, the independent Executive authority is at its highest.
To hold otherwise would make Congress itself a target of such
agents, as appeared in the year 2001. We have no hesitation in
confirming the President's power to issue the Executive Order
challenged at bar; should circumstances change, there will be
ample opportunity for the public will to be heard, through its
representatives in Congress and in the electoral process.
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The release of this opinion had an unexpected effect. With
the courts effectively removed from the picture, when some re-
gions began to complain that they were shortchanged in the allo-
cation of vaccine and others that it was none of their affair and
that their citizens should be relieved from undergoing vaccina-
tions for what was a non-communicable disease there was no con-
sensus to resolve these disputes. New reports of infections (largely
erroneous) began to pour into the CDC. When the federal gov-
ernment announced that 90% of the available vaccine stocks had
been distributed to the states but that only 15% of the population
would be covered, demonstrations erupted in many cities. Wild
conspiracy theories circulated, exacerbated by the failure to ap-
prehend the perpetrators of the crime. When a well-known athlete
died of a hemorrhagic infection, rumors circulated that a new bio-
logical attack was underway. Television commentators misinter-
preted the technical statements of experts on the report and clinical
descriptions of the Ebola virus filled the evening news. The White
House and the CDC received dozens of calls from furious gover-
nors, mayors and health commissioners demanding to know why
they were not informed of additional bioterrorist attacks using
Ebola. Nurses, doctors, and hospital support personnel in health
centers walked off their jobs; some were arrested pursuant to the
Executive Order. Thousands of persons who had attended games
in which the deceased athlete had played demanded treatment.
HHS issued a press release explaining that the athlete had not had
Ebola virus. The FBI affirmed that there was no reason to believe
that a new attack using hemorrhagic fever virus was underway but
the FBI also refused to rule out the possibility that there had been
more than a single bioterrorist attack using anthrax.
THE HISTORICAL APPROACH
Delegates to the Convention in 1787 met in a city that had
recently been struck by a violent and deadly infection. Philadel-
phia was the epicenter of a virulent outbreak of yellow fever.
Houses with infected persons were required to fly red flags and
these were so numerous that visitors to the city commented on
them in letters home. Dolly Payne was free to meet and marry
James Madison, the principal author of our Constitution, be-
cause she had been recently widowed by the yellow fever epi-
demic. Accordingly, we may be certain-as is rarely the case in
constitutional interpretation -that if the framers and ratifiers
had intended the federal government to take over the health
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care system of the United States there would have been some
mention of this intention.
Even if we were to assume that the president possessed the
authority to act in advance of the Congress, the latter being in an
enforced recess, he would not be empowered beyond that which
the Congress could, constitutionally, provide. That power must
flow from the Commerce Clause, yet even a cursory review of
the intentions of the founding generation casts doubt on a con-
struction of that Clause that would support the Executive Order.
The most persuasive evidence of the original purpose and
scope of the Commerce Clause can be found in The Federalist
Papers. There is nothing to suggest that this scope was intended
to include the intrastate activities purportedly governed by the
Executive Order. In Federalist No. 42, Madison emphasizes the
key link between the regulation of foreign commerce and that
among the states: Without the commerce power "the great and
essential power of regulating foreign commerce would have been
incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this power
was the relief of the States which import and export through
other States from the improper contributions levied on them by
the latter. ''56 This clear intention provides no basis on which to
regulate non-commercial intrastate activities. This intent is con-
firmed by No. 45:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. [They] will be exer-
cised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-
tion, and foreign commerce.... The powers reserved to the
several States will extend to all objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of
the people, and the internal order, improvement and prosper-
ity of the State.
5 7
In the same Paper, Madison could scarcely have written, "The
regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems
to be an addition which few oppose and from which no appre-
hensions are entertained"58 if the health and domestic safety of
the public were to be subsumed under this clause.
56. Federalist 42 (Madison) in Robert B. Luce, ed., The Federalist Papers 247
(1976).
57. Federalist 45 (Madison) at 303 (cited in note 56).
58. Id.
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Because the Executive Order is essentially regulatory in na-
ture, it must stand or fall on this basis. And yet it is precisely this
basis-which is reserved to the states-on which it cannot stand.
The effect of this ruling was cataclysmic. A frightened and
wary public suddenly was told that it would take a constitutional
amendment to protect them. Being Americans, they immediately
decided to protect themselves instead. Several cities experienced
outbreaks of civil unrest. News reports that the members of the
Supreme Court had secretly been inoculated did nothing to en-
hance their prestige. The National Guard was called out in sev-
eral states; the Court ended its term early, ostensibly on the
grounds that it feared its chambers to be contaminated. The De-
mocratic and Republican conventions, as well as sports events and
other large meetings were canceled. In several states summer va-
cation for schoolchildren was moved forward. No community
wished to invite the president and his entourage to visit. Small
businesses in cities that depended on tourism failed; cities -which
presented lucrative targets to terrorists-began to lose population.
Irrationally, many persons refused to serve on juries or attend
public meetings for fear of contracting infections.
But the greatest effect of the Supreme Court decision was
overseas: other countries simply were astounded at the decision
and their leaders concluded that the American constitution, which
few abroad understood, crippled the U.S. from protecting itself
against novel, 21st century threats. The dollar fell; alliances weak-
ened; secret bargaining by other countries with anti-American ter-
rorist groups took place in contexts that suggested extortion.
THE ETHICAL APPROACH
We begin, as we began, with the Declaration of Independ-
ence. Whatever doubts constitutional scholars once maintained
about the relevance of the Declaration as constitutional law, it
has become increasingly clear that that document is both incor-
porated by reference in the constitutional text (as by the 9th
amendment,59 for example) and is pervasive throughout the
document taken as a whole. The Declaration provides the foun-
dation on which the unique American theory of constitutionally
limited government is constructed.
59. Charles L. Black, Jr., A New Birth of Freedom. Human Rights, Named and Un-
named (Putnam Publishing, 1997).
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In its most famous passage the Declaration asserts that gov-
ernments are instituted among mankind in order to secure man-
kind's rights to security, freedom and autonomy. All of these
rights are threatened at this hour. The attacks on students, gov-
ernment employees and others in Austin and elsewhere were not
directed at Texas per se or its institutions; these were merely the
venue for a more grandiose atrocity. The goal of the killers who
struck at the president's group was to render the security of
every American questionable, precisely because the attacks were
not aimed at any particular person; to restrain our freedoms by
lashing them to that most pitiless of all masters, the human sense
of fear; and to make of every day decisions (where to live,
whether to have children, what associations to pursue) public
acts dictated by distant, public enemies.
The President's Executive Order has been represented by
counsel as a threat to American human rights but as the Decla-
ration of Independence reminds us, it is those rights that impose
upon the government the obligation to insure their protection.
A government that was prevented from ensuring rights would be
the adversary of human rights just as surely as if it were an
oppressor. Viewed against these fundamental obligations
imposed on government, and the assumption that where the
People have given the government a task they must be
presumed, in the absence of a contrary prohibition, to have also
given the government the tools to carry out that task, we can
find no infirmity in the Order. There is no prohibition, explicit
or implicit, that would prevent such an Order. There is no
human right to imperil others by refusing treatment of one's own
person; to hold otherwise would imperil the basis for all rights.
The Anti-Deficiency Act is sufficient to compensate whatever
taking may be found to have occurred with respect to
pharmaceutical products.
This opinion was greeted with relief in most quarters, except-
ing perhaps the country's law faculties. Congress was embold-
ened to begin oversight investigations. The FDA was accused by
some members as having obstructed the development of vaccines
on orders from the White House which, prior to April 1st, had
been negotiating an arms control agreement on biological weap-
ons. Congressional investigations of the FBI arose with the goal
of enhancing the Executive's authority to collect intelligence on
Americans as well as foreign persons. Congress voted funds to
aid those states with the largest number of anthrax cases, paying
for added public health personnel and overtime for police. All in
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all, the Supreme Court opinion helped set in motion a certain
sense that government was not the enemy of the society's well-
being, as it was sometimes portrayed, but was an indispensable
protector.
THE DOCTRINAL APPROACH
While there is no precedent directly on point, the guidance
given us by a number of relevant cases, taken as a whole, clearly
cannot sustain the president's Executive Order. Some cases af-
firming Executive authority, such as Little v. Barreme,60 depend
upon the Congress's ratification of the president's acts, either be-
fore (as in Little) or after the fact (as in The Prize Cases61).
Some depend upon Congress's tacit ratification of presidential
action by a long and unbroken record of acquiescence. 62 Of
course no such acquiescence can be presumed in the instant case
precisely because its incidence is so novel, even if horrifyingly so.
To be sure, there are cases holding that the president has
inherent powers to protect the integrity of his office 63 or to pro-
tect the performance of federal duties.64 And it is true that the
vicious attacks that provoked the Executive Order were di-
rected, to some degree, against the person and staff of the presi-
dent himself. But no order as sweeping as the one at issue in this
case could be supported on such narrow grounds. The federal
government does not commandeer hospitals in Texas, or patents
on drugs, simply to protect the president.
If there is a case whose context most resembles the one at
bar, it is Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,65 in which this
Court held that a presidential order seizing the assets of certain
steel mills was beyond the power of the Executive when the
Congress had declined to provide direct and uncontrovertible
authorization. Such authorization is not present here, where the
scope of the Executive authority claimed is vastly greater.
Holding as we do that the president is without power to en-
force the Executive Order, we need not consider whether, under
60. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
61. 67 U.S. 635 (1863).
62. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459 (1915).
63. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (involving the subordination of
an inferior executive officer to the direction of the president).
64. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), which involved an assault on a federal offi-
cial, and In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895) (relating to protection of the mails).
65. 343 U. S. 579 (1952).
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our recent commerce clause precedents, the Congress could val-
idly adopt the various provisions of that Order as a statute.
The impact of this decision is hard to gauge. It thrust the
Court-and its most conservative members-into the election of
2004 with one candidate for the presidency claiming that he would
favor impeachment of the two most libertarian judges who, it was
said, had put a doctrinaire laissez-faire philosophy ahead of the
welfare of the country, while the incumbent whose Executive Or-
der was struck down was forced to defend them. Because the bulk
of the task of protecting society was successfully taken up by the
private sector through insurance, the development of nanosensors,
and enhanced commercial surveillance and information gathering
on threats, the fears of new attacks abated. The locus of terrorist
attacks moved overseas, at least for the time being.
IV. THE PURPOSE OF SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION
In Part Two of this essay I have tried to give, after the man-
ner of Pessoa, different voices to different approaches to consti-
tutional adjudication, and I have speculated what new worlds
such voices might call into being. The point of such an exercise
is not to predict the future; my speculations are far too contrived
and too sketchy for that, in any case. Rather it is to sensitize the
reader to the unpredictable and to dislodge, as far as I can, the
insistence that any single approach is optimal.
CONCLUSION
Someday-sooner than we hope, later than we fear-
constitutional decisions of the kind I have described will be upon
us. Not only the Court but other constitutional actors, like the
president, will have to make tragic choices in the face of great
emotion, suffering and the imminence of death. I do not believe
that there is a mechanics by which such choices can best be
made-only a cultivation of the conscience by which these deci-
sions ultimately are resolved. Exercises in the craft of the law
are one means of such cultivation.
